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Abstract
Everybody has heard of neighbours, who have been fighting over some minor topic for years. The fight goes back and forth,
giving the neighbours a hard time. These kind of reciprocal punishments are known as vendettas and they are a cross-
cultural phenomenon. In evolutionary biology, punishment is seen as a mechanism for maintaining cooperative behaviour.
However, this notion of punishment excludes vendettas. Vendettas pose a special kind of evolutionary problem: they incur
high costs on individuals, i.e. costs of punishing and costs of being punished, without any benefits. Theoretically speaking,
punishment should be rare in dyadic relationships and vendettas would not evolve under natural selection. In contrast,
punishment is assumed to be more efficient in group environments which then can pave the way for vendettas.
Accordingly, we found that under the experimental conditions of a prisoner’s dilemma game, human participants punished
only rarely and vendettas are scarce. In contrast, we found that participants retaliated frequently in the group environment
of a public goods game. They even engaged in cost-intense vendettas (i.e. continuous retaliation), especially when the first
punishment was unjustified or ambiguous. Here, punishment was mainly targeted at defectors in the beginning, but
provocations led to mushrooming of counter-punishments. Despite the counter-punishing behaviour, participants were
able to enhance cooperation levels in the public goods game. Few participants even seemed to anticipate the outbreak of
costly vendettas and delayed their punishment to the last possible moment. Overall, our results highlight the importance of
different social environments while studying punishment as a cooperation-enhancing mechanism.
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Introduction
Many species, especially humans, frequently cooperate and
provide help to each other (for recent reviews, see e.g. [1,2]).
Cooperative behaviour prevails despite theoretical difficulties to
explain its evolution. Why cooperate if one could enjoy the
benefits provided by others and refrain from costly cooperative
behaviour oneself? This is the so-called free-rider problem [3].
One hotly debated mechanism to prevent free-riding is punishment –
a widespread behaviour in human interactions and in dyadic
animal interactions (for reviews, see [4–8]). However, punishment
can escalate into vendettas where ‘‘I punish you, because you
punished me’’ leads to a vicious circle of counter-punishments.
How can punishment then be beneficial for cooperation?
Punishment is understood as a behaviour that has costs for the
target and somewhat lower costs to the punishing individual itself.
As punishment is costly, there appears no incentive to punish. This
situation is analogous to the free-rider problem of cooperation,
whereby non-punishers represent second-order free-riders [9].
The second-order free-rider problem has been investigated
intensively and under certain conditions punishment is evolution-
ary stable [10–15]. Moreover, an extensive amount of experimen-
tal research shows that in groups as well as dyadic interactions
humans employ costly punishment and that thereby cooperation is
enhanced (group games: e.g. [16–23]; dyadic games: [24], but see
[25]). Even symbolic gestures of punishment [26] raise cooperation
levels. However, earnings are usually negatively affected, because
the costs of punishment cannot be compensated by higher
cooperative benefits [17,19,23,24]. On the other hand, if
relationships last very long, negative effects of punishment costs
can be overcome at the group level [21].
Previous research in the area of costly punishment has mainly
concentrated on situations where punishment cannot be retaliated
(e.g. [10,18]). Under most natural conditions this is not the case.
Usually punishment can be avenged by victims as has also been
described in history and literature. For instance, in Shakespeare’s
[27] Romeo and Juliet, the love relationship is so dramatic since
the Montague and Capulet families were deeply involved in a
vendetta. Vendettas are a cross-cultural phenomenon [28]. There
are blood vendettas between Turkish farmers lasting as long as 60
years [29]. Vendettas occurred in the Mediterranean area in the
nineteenth-century [30] and they proliferate in science [31].
Sometimes these vendettas escalate and then one reads headlines
like ‘‘A 20-year feud between two neighbours […] revved up this
week, ending in bloodshed’’ [32]. These yearlong vendettas often
begin with a punishment of one party, which is perceived as
unjustified by the victim [33], and turn into a continuous exchange
of retributions.
Recently, there has been growing interest in the effect of
retaliation on cooperative games with punishment [24,34–36].
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They show that humans avenge punishment regardless of its
negative effect on payoffs. However, in most cases cooperation
cannot be sustained by vengeful punishment. Hitherto, the
possibility that punishment can escalate into vendettas has been
precluded by restricting punishment to a single retaliation stage
[34,35,37]. Though Denant-Boemont et al. [34] and Dreber et al.
[24] provide the possibility for repeated counter-punishment in
groups and dyads, respectively, their focus lays on another topic
(neglecting the analysis of possible vendettas). In addition, Denant-
Boemont et al.’s set-up provides incentives to distribute one’s
punishment across all punishment rounds. Nikiforakis and
Engelmann [36] study the possible outbreak of vendettas in
groups where participants determined the number of punishment
rounds through their behaviour. As long as (a) they punished in the
previous round and (b) they had money to invest in punishment
there was another opportunity to punish. Participants could invest
all their remaining money in a single punishment act. Thereby a
high risk of severe retaliation was generated. In this group set-up,
they demonstrate that participants try to avoid vendettas by simply
refraining from punishment. Vendettas occur rarely. In fact, in
only about 7% of all groups was there a sufficient number of
punishment rounds reached for vendettas to be possible. In a few
cases, retaliatory punishment stopped because participants could
no longer afford to retaliate. Hence, under these conditions the
occurrence of vendettas might be reduced. Overall, the issue of
whether humans (be it in a dyadic or group environment) engage
in costly punishment, which can escalate into vendettas, and how
these vendettas are initiated and terminated remains on the whole
unanswered.
Despite the vengefulness observed in humans, theoretical
research shows that punishment vendettas are not evolutionary
stable. In infinitely repeated, dyadic interactions the best response
to an opponent’s defection is defection and not punishment. On
top of that, defection is preferred as a response to an opponent’s
punishment as opposed to punishment [38]. Furthermore, a single
stage of retaliation cannot stabilize groups’ cooperative behaviour
in one-shot encounters [37]. Here, concealing the punisher’s
identity, and thus making retaliation harder, has positive effects on
cooperation. This theoretical evidence suggests that, in coopera-
tive games, little punishment is expected and certainly no
vendettas. In general, it is assumed that punishment is more likely
to evolve as a mechanism to prevent free-riding in groups [8]. By
contrast, punishment in dyadic interactions might be too costly –
especially in light of possible vendettas – to evolve as a mechanism
to maintain cooperation [8,24,38]. Only here, can defection be
targeted specifically at free-riders without group-level detriments.
Hence, if at all, only group environments provide the potential for
vendettas.
In this study, we allow for vendettas by combining (a) the public
goods game (PG; [39,40]) and (b) the prisoner’s dilemma game
(PD; [41,42]) with multiple consecutive opportunities of costly
punishment. This enables us to investigate our main interest: the
emergence of vendettas. In line with reality, participants can thus
punish their punisher in the same way immediately or later.
Rational choice theory assumes that people should take this
behaviour into account. Punishing social partners, who can choose
to retaliate, first produces costs for punishing and second can lead
to potentially higher costs when partners retaliate. This leads to
exaggerated costs of punishment that should be avoided by the
rational individual. In line with this, an evolutionary model [38]
demonstrates that vendettas do not evolve. On the other side,
however, empirical studies of costly punishment, where vendettas
are impossible, show that people do indeed engage in punishment,
which then stabilizes cooperation (e.g. [18]). In addition, aspects of
spite (e.g. [43]) or inequity aversion [44,45] can also motivate
counter-punishment behaviour. Therefore, despite the high costs
of possible vendettas, we expect participants to engage in
punishment and counter-punishment in the group environment.
Additionally, vendettas can be observed under natural conditions.
Therefore, we expect humans also to engage in vendetta
punishment under the experimental conditions of the PG.
However, participants in dyadic interactions should rather abstain
from punishment [8], offering no opportunities for vendettas in the
PD. Hence, we will address if social interactions trigger vendettas,
who starts them and who terminates them. Subsequently, we
investigate how cooperative behaviour and overall payoffs in the
PG and the PD will be affected.
Methods
First-semester biology students from the Universities of Kiel,
Hamburg and Mu¨nster, Germany, as well as Vienna, Austria,
joined the experiment voluntarily. All participants gave their
informed consent to participate. Before playing, they were
informed about the scientific procedures when publishing data
and that their behaviour would be collected, analysed and
published without an association between participants’ real
identities and behaviour in the games. Specifically, anonymity of
participants was always preserved and no demographic data (e.g.
gender, age) were collected during the games. By random
assignment to a computer and random assignment of an alias, as
well as a special payment procedure (see below) this anonymity
was ensured. As it is standard in socio-economic experiments,
there were no additional ethical concerns beyond that mentioned
above and preserving the anonymity of participants.
For the PG, a total of 96 participants were randomly assigned
into six sessions of 16 participants each. For the PD, seven sessions
of six participants each were conducted (n = 42). In each session,
participants were randomly seated in front of an individual
computer with partitions between participants. In order not to
disclose their real identity, but still allow for individual recognition
within the game, participants received an alias, i.e. names of
moons of our solar system (e.g. Despina or Metis), at the beginning
of the games. Participants were told that they have to make
decisions during the experiment whether to invest their money or
not in different situations. A short introduction ensured that
participants understood how to handle the computer, that they
were completely anonymous throughout and after the game
concerning their behaviour within the experiment, that they
should not talk to one another or draw attention to them during
the experiment, and that they would receive all their earnings
anonymously in cash. After the experiment, each participant could
collect her earnings out of an envelope entitled with her alias from
behind partitions (as described in [46]). Thus, the participant
herself was the only person who knew her identity in the
experiment. Participants earned on average 13.41J 63.01 (mean
6 s.d.) in the PG and 15.40J 66.43 in the PD.
For the PG, our experimental design follows the one of Fehr
and Ga¨chter [18] where the participants were arranged into
subgroups of four individuals each, and first played a PG round
followed by the possibility to punish other members of the
subgroup. The starting amount was set to 20J for each
participant. In the PG situation, participants had to decide
whether or not to contribute 1.00J to a public good (this contrasts
the continuous contributions in [18], as in [20,46]). They knew
that the sum of all contributions will be multiplied by 1.6 and
distributed equally among all subgroup members irrespective of
their contribution. In the following punishment round, partici-
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pants were informed about the PG investments of all subgroup
members and could then assign a punishment from 0 to 10 units
for each subgroup member separately. Again, following Fehr and
Ga¨chter, each point of punishment assigned resulted in a threefold
fine to be paid by the punished subgroup member. If for instance a
player invested 0.30J ( = 3 units) to punish somebody, the account
of the punished member was reduced by 0.90J ( = 9 units).
Negative earnings were possible, but after the experiment ended
those participants (i.e. 4 out of 96) were informed that their
account balance was zero. The difference from Fehr and Ga¨chter
[18] is that instead of just one, a sequence of five punishment
rounds was played after the initial PG round. In these successive
punishment rounds participants knew exactly who punished whom
with how much money for each subgroup member.
In the dyadic set-up, the six participants were randomly
assigned into subgroups of two. Participants first played the PD
which was then followed by five successive rounds of punishment.
Participants received a starting amount of 20J each, as in the PG
set-up. For the PD, they had to decide whether or not to
contribute 1.00J, the sum of all contributions would be multiplied
by 1.6 and distributed equally among both subgroup members
irrespective of contributions. Accordingly, mutual cooperation
(defection) yielded a payoff of 0.60J (0.00J), being exploited
resulted in a loss of 20.20J and a gain of 0.80J for the one who
exploited. In the following punishment rounds, participants were
informed about the PD outcome and could then assign a
punishment to their subgroup member. The punishment incurred
a cost of 0.50J to the punisher and a threefold fine of 1.50J to the
target (i.e. in contrast to the PG set-up where punishment was
continuous). Then punishment amounts were announced to both
players and the next round of punishment followed. Negative
earnings occurred for 1 out of 42 participants and, as in the PG,
she was informed that her account balance was 0.00J.
In each session, 16 participants in the PG played the
aforementioned sequence of rounds (PG followed by five
punishment rounds) three times ( = three periods). Participants in
the PD played five periods, each consisted of the sequence of a PD
followed by five punishment rounds. Participants were not
informed about the number of PG or PD rounds nor the number
of punishment rounds. Between each period, participants were
reshuffled into new subgroups of four or two individuals in a way
that excluded any kind of reputation building (i.e. participants
received no information about the previous behaviour of new
subgroup members) and direct reciprocity between periods. Being
aware of this condition, no participant was able to meet a previous
subgroup member in later periods again.
For statistical analyses SPSS 18.0.2 and R 2.12.1 were used. A
5%-level of significance is used and probabilities are reported as
two tailed. Furthermore, for both games analyses were done on the
session level, if not stated otherwise. Exceptions are the generalized
linear mixed models where session effects are considered in terms
of random factors.
Results
Cooperation in the Public Goods Game and the
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game
As the research design is partially adapted from Fehr and
Ga¨chter [18], we also applied their statistical analysis where
applicable. Our results show that the level of cooperation in the
PG rounds increased (period 1:47.9615.6; period 2:65.667.7;
period 3:71.968.6; comparing period 1 vs. period 3; Wilcoxon
signed-rank test: Z = 2.21, n = 6, p,0.05). In the PD, cooperation
did not change over periods (period 1:78.467.8; period
2:78.6612.4; period 3:80.7166.1; period 4:85.7614.9; period
5:78.6612.4; comparing period 1 vs. period 5; Wilcoxon signed-
rank test: Z = 0.38, n = 7, p = 0.71).
Punishment after the Social Interactions
Punishment was frequent in the PG set-up. In overall 15 rounds
of punishment and with the possibility to punish up to three
subgroup members, 85.4% of the participants punished at least
once; 52.1% at least five times; and 21.9% at least 10 times.
Within period 1 investment in punishment did not change over the
five rounds of punishment (see Fig. 1; Friedman test: x2 = 2.12,
df = 4, n = 6, p = 0.71). However, we found significant changes in
periods 2 and 3 (period 2: x2 = 11.42, df = 4, n = 6, p,0.05; period
3: x2 = 14.08, df = 4, n = 6, p,0.01). In period 1, participants did
not yet know the total number of rounds played in each period,
afterwards they could guess. In periods 2 and 3, we observed an
increase in punishment investment in the very last round. To
analyse this last round effect, we compared punishment in the last
and the second-last round. The respective differences were
significantly different in period 2 (Wilcoxon signed-rank test:
Z = 2.20, n = 6, p,0.05) and we found a trend in period 3
(Z = 1.58, n = 6, p = 0.12). Further analysis revealed that the high
punishment investment in round 5 was due to few participants (in
each period: 10 out of 96), who invested high amounts to punish
(period 2:0.85J60.23; period 3:0.91J60.19). These participants
avenged their punishment of round 4 (period 2:30%; period
3:26%), but also delayed their revenge of being punished in rounds
1 to 3 (period 2:40%; period 3:47%).
Multiple rounds of punishment in the PG allowed participants
to punish back after receiving a fine. Indeed on average up to 80%
of all punishing participants retaliated their punishment in a given
period (period 1:0.8060.09; period 2:0.5860.20; period
3:0.4260.17). Within acts of punishment there was a significant
relationship between punishment investment by the punisher and
counter-punishment investment by the target. We used general-
ized linear mixed models (GLMMs), in which we included punisher
identity and target identity nested within sessions as random factors, to
model the received counter-punishment (0 to 10 units) in the current
round as a function of original punishment (1 to 10 units) in the
previous round. GLMMs were fitted by Laplace approximation
assuming Poisson error distribution. We found that, the higher the
original fine, the higher the counter-punishment (from round to
round: intercept =20.61 to 21.03, s.e. = 0.21 to 0.30, p,0.05;
b= 0.15 to 0.23, s.e. = 0.04 to 0.06, p,0.05).
To analyse the motives of participants in the PG to punish we
used GLMMs to model punishment (0 to 10 units) as a function of
participant’s and target’s PG decisions, subgroup members’ PG decisions, and
provocation (i.e. in punishment rounds 2 to 5 the punishment
investment by the target in the previous round). We controlled for
differences in periods and in participants, who are nested within
sessions, and included these as random factors. We looked at the
given models for each punishment round separately; hereby
allowing motives for punishment to differ between rounds.
GLMMs were fitted by Laplace approximation assuming Poisson
error distribution. The variance inflation factors are all less than
1.25, which indicates that multicollinearity is not a problem in the
models’ estimations [47]. In punishment round 1, the participant’s
and her target’s behaviour in the PG predicted the punishment
investment of the participant, i.e. if both contributed then
punishment became less likely (see Tab. 1). In subsequent rounds
of punishment the importance of the PG behaviour varies.
However, the behaviour of the two other subgroup members is
now important, as the more of them contributed, the more likely
the punishment of the target became. In addition, the previous
Vendettas and Cooperative Behaviour
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amount of punishment by the target significantly increased
investments by the participant to punish the target in the current
round.
In line with the results from the GLMMs for punishment round
1, punishment was directed at non-contributing (i.e. defecting)
participants. In particular, contributors, who punished defectors,
spend the most money on punishment (see Fig. 2; punishment
significantly differs between outcomes of PG behaviour of punisher
and target: Friedman test, x2 = 12.2, df = 3, n = 6, p,0.01). In all
subsequent rounds the punishment investment did not differ
according to the PG behaviour of the punisher and the target (see
Fig. S1). This is in line with the GLMMs, as they showed that now
the behaviour of other subgroup members and provocations
gained importance.
In contrast to the group interactions, punishment was rare in
the PD set-up (therefore, we only provide a brief analysis here). In
overall 25 rounds of punishment, 30.2% of the participants
punished at least once. Moreover, in every punishment round on
average only 0.8160.35 participants punished (see also Fig. S2,
S3). Multiple rounds of punishment allow participants to punish
back after receiving a fine. Of those few that were actually
punished about 35% retaliated their punishment (period
1:0.6560.25; period 2:0.5960.26; period 3:0.1860.27; period
4:0.2060.34; period 5:0.1160.20).
Vendettas of Costly Punishment
For both games, a minimum of three sequential punishments
was defined as a vendetta, i.e. player A started by punishing player
B, who retaliated this punishment, and was again punished by
player A in the next round. In the PG set-up, vendettas were
frequent. We observed 71 vendettas in total (i.e. on average 0.99
vendettas occurred in a given subgroup per period; whereas [36]
Figure 1. Average punishment investment (+ s.d.) per participant in the public goods game. In each of the three periods, participants
played one round of public good followed by five rounds of punishment.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093.g001
Table 1. Results of the generalized linear mixed models to model punishment investment in the public goods game.
round 1 round 2 round 3 round 4 round 5
intercept 23.36 *** 23.45 *** 23.64 *** 23.52 *** 22.97 ***
(0.33) (0.43) (0.49) (0.38) (0.35)
P contributed and T did not 2.55 *** 0.71 ** 1.07 *** 20.20 20.02
contribute into the PG 1 (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.24) (0.17)
P did not contribute and T 0.72 ** 0.82 *** 0.83 *** 0.39 20.47 ***
contributed into the PG 1 (0.27) (0.22) (0.23) (0.23) (0.14)
P and T did not contribute 1.33 *** 0.72 ** 0.84 *** 20.61 * 20.17
into the PG 1 (0.26) (0.26) (0.24) (0.28) (0.18)
other two subgroup members’ 0.17 0.22 * 0.28 ** 0.47 *** 0.30 ***
behaviour in PG 2 (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.09)
provocation n/a 0.48 *** 0.42 *** 0.43 *** 0.20 ***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Provided are the estimates, the standard errors in brackets and the p-values as * p,0.05,
**p,0.01,
***p,0.001.
The period, the participant’s identity and the session were added as random factors in all models (n = 864, in each round 96 participants could punish up to three
subgroup members in three periods). For punishment in round 1 no previous provocation (in terms of punishment investment by the target in the previous round) is
possible.
1The contribution of both, the participant (P) and her target (T), into the public good (PG) served as reference group of the categorical fixed factor participant’s and
target’s PG decisions.
2The behaviour of the remaining two subgroup members was coded as 0, 1, or both contributed into the PG.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093.t001
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observed 0.03 vendettas per subgroup). On average participants
were involved in 1.4860.88 vendettas and vendettas lasted on
average 3.8960.39 rounds (period 1:3.7260.24; period
2:4.0660.61; period 3:3.9260.17). Often vendettas ended because
the final round of punishment was reached (46% of 71 vendettas).
Otherwise, in 30% (24%) of the time a non-contributor
(contributor) stopped the on-going punishment sequence. In
addition, a clear pattern arises when looking at punishment in
round 1 and whether a vendetta developed or not on the level of
individual interactions (see Fig. 3). Justified punishment of a non-
contributor by a contributor was most frequent, but did not lead to
vendettas in most cases (77%). All other punishments, i.e.
unjustified punishment of a contributor by a non-contributing
participant and ambiguous punishment (a contributor punished a
contributor; or non-contributor punished a non-contributor),
triggered a vendetta in about 50% of the time. Those players
engaging in vendettas pay large costs, since it includes their
punishment investment and counter-punishment fines. Comparing
average payoffs of participants that were involved in vendettas
(10.44J 64.25) and participants that were never involved in a
vendetta (i.e. neither started one nor did counter-punish that
resulted in a vendetta; 17.05J 61.29) showed, that the latter
earned significantly more money (sign test: n = 6, p,0.05). This is
also true for players retaliating punishment (11.87J 62.84) versus
players refraining completely from retaliation (17.15J 61.34; sign
test: n = 6, p,0.05).
On the contrary, we observed only 12 vendettas in the PD set-
up (i.e. on average 0.11 vendettas occurred in a given dyad per
period). On average participants were involved in 0.5760.69
vendettas, however, in three sessions (i.e. 45 dyads) no vendetta
occurred at all. Vendettas lasted on average 3.2060.33 rounds
(period 1:3.2560.35; period 2:3.0060.00; period 3:3.0060.00,
period 4:3.7561.06; period 5:3.00). Vendettas occurred in mutual
cooperative relationships (58%), when a cooperator started to
punish a defector (25%), or when a defector started to punish a
cooperator (17%). Vendettas never occurred in mutual defective
relationships (though this was a rare outcome in general). Often
vendettas ended because the final round of punishment was
reached (58% of 12 vendettas). Otherwise, in 33% (8%) of the time
a cooperator (defector) stopped the on-going punishment se-
quence.
Discussion
Vendettas occur under natural conditions [28–30]. Being in a
group environment, the participants in our experiment of a public
goods game with five rounds of punishment opportunities
frequently retaliated (i.e. immediate counter-punishment) and
engaged in vendettas (on average 1.5 per participant), too. This
happened even though vendettas, i.e. at least three sequential
rounds of punishment, are cost-intense, as one has to pay costs for
punishing and costs for being punished, multiplied by several
instances. This contrasts earlier findings for groups in a different
punishment environment. Here vendettas were rare [36]. Despite
the costliness of vendettas and their inefficiency (i.e. they
significantly reduced earnings compared to players, who abstained
completely from vendettas) we observed an-eye-for-an-eye coun-
ter-punishment, where high punishment was answered with high
counter-punishment. This supports the view that counter-punish-
ment possibly escalating into vendettas is due to an attempt to
restore equity between participants [33,44,45,48,49]. In the
example of fighting neighbours, both see themselves as victims
and both go on to restore (subjective) justice. The initial social
interaction of the PG was relevant for the first punishment, i.e.
defectors attracted the highest punishment. In later rounds, players
primarily reacted to provocations (previous punishment). In
addition, participants in the PG relied on the behaviour of other
subgroup members as a social reference point: the more those
cooperated the more likely the remaining subgroup member
‘‘deserved’’ punishment. This possibility of social comparison
might explain the enhanced punishment and the more frequent
outbreak of vendettas in the group environment compared to the
dyadic environment. The durations of vendettas were rather long.
In fact, participants’ vendettas lasted on average about four out of
five rounds. Vendettas in the PG normally started with an
unjustified punishment (i.e. a non-contributor punished a contrib-
utor) or when the meaning of the punishment was rather
Figure 2. Average punishment investment (+ s.d.) in the first
round of punishment in the public goods game (pooled over
all periods). Participants could either contribute into the public good,
C, or defect, D. Hence, in CD a contributor punished a defector (CC, DC,
DD, respectively; Friedman test: x2 = 12.2, df = 3, n = 6, p,0.01).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093.g002
Figure 3. Frequencies where a participant in the public goods
game punished a subgroup member in punishment round 1
and either a vendetta or no vendetta occurred (pooled over all
periods). Punishment was classified as justified if a contributing
participant punished a non-contributor (n = 106, individual level); it was
termed unjustified if a non-contributing participant punished a
contributor (n = 26); all other cases were rather ambiguous and not
further classified (n = 42).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0045093.g003
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ambiguous (i.e. a contributor punished a contributor; or non-
contributor punished a non-contributor). When the punished
individual had defected and was ‘‘properly’’ punished by a
cooperative participant vendettas seldom started (i.e. only in 23%
of all cases; in [36] all vendettas within a period were triggered by
defecting individuals). Vendettas ended out of various reasons:
non-contributors (30%) or contributors (24%) stopped punishing
or the final punishment round was reached (the number of rounds
was not announced to participants).
Despite the occurrence of costly punishment, retaliations, and
even vendettas in the group environment, the frequency of
cooperation increased over time. This occurred even though direct
reciprocity and reputation building between PG rounds were
excluded. This result contradicts earlier findings where the
vengeful response to being punished alone cannot sustain
cooperation [34,35].However, allowing for further escalations in
terms of vendettas can maintain cooperation [34,36]. The increase
of cooperation in the PG is presumably due to the effect of the first
punishment round where high amounts of punishment were
targeted at defecting participants. Punishment of non-contributors
as a direct response to their defection, excluding the possibility of
vendettas, is also observed in previous studies [18,19]. Neverthe-
less, in experiments earnings are usually negatively affected (e.g.
[17,24]), which is especially true for participants, who engaged in
retaliation and vendettas in this experiment. In line with our
findings, other experimental studies also report unjustified
punishment, which in general has been termed anti-social
punishment [22]. However, the evolution of cooperation is not
supported in the presence of anti-social punishment [50–52]. In
our study, anti-social punishment acts frequently led to vendettas,
making the original unjustified or anti-social punishment very
costly. Given that punishment can escalate, this could serve as
means to reduce anti-social punishment to a minimum in long-
term relationships.
Remarkably, by predicting after the first period the given PG
set-up of the second and third period some participants were able
to avoid costly vendettas. These participants delayed their
punishment to the expected last round of punishment. This is in
line with findings that participants, who were able to control the
duration of possible punishment acts, in the majority tried to avoid
retaliating punishment [36]. In addition, our participants invested
high amounts to punish, indicating a final revenge for being
punished in previous rounds where they patiently refrained from
immediate counter-punishment to avoid the danger of paying
counter-punishment fines themselves.
In contrast to the results of the public goods game, we find that
vendettas are rare in dyadic relationships of the prisoner’s
dilemma game. In three out of seven sessions, these participants
did not even engage in a single vendetta. Though, vendettas are
scarce different social rules seem to operate compared to the ones
we observed in the group environment. In the dyadic environ-
ment, defectors did not feel the need to end an on-going
punishment sequence and vendettas ceased to exist faster, by half
a round. In sum, punishment and retaliation were infrequent in
the PD, also because in the dyads participants acted mostly
cooperative. This occurred even though we had excluded
reputation building and direct reciprocity. Overall, our results
are in line with the conjecture that punishment as a mechanism to
maintain cooperation is conditioned on environmental attributes
such as the number of interaction partners [8]. To that effect,
costly punishment is more frequent in group environments to
control free-riders and less efficient in dyadic environments where
reciprocal defection constitutes a superior way to sanction free-
riders [8,38].
Our results for the group environment are in accordance with
earlier findings that humans are willing to punish and retaliate (e.g.
[6,19,34,35]). We extended this line of research by showing that
acts of punishment, when common in groups, can escalate into
vendettas. However, the behaviour of our participants is in
contradiction to theoretical postulations that vendettas should not
occur under natural selection [37], as defection is the proper
response evolving after provoking punishment [38]. Nevertheless,
a tendency to avenge can also be found in animals [4,53]. For
instance, Japanese macaques sometimes use indirect revenge
against an aggressor’s kin [54]. These counter-aggressive acts seem
to have regulatory effects, as they happen in the presence of the
aggressor, who however is unable to intervene. Thus these acts can
serve as means to reduce the likelihood of further attacks of the
aggressor against the revenging individual. Vendettas in human
societies are also attributed a functional quality [30,55]. For one,
vendettas are thought to provide rules for escalating conflicts and
thereby they might reduce the likelihood of full escalation (e.g.
death of innocents). Additionally, social norms prescribe which
kind of behaviour is to be avenged. Here, we also found that
vendettas in the PG occur only under certain circumstances: after
unjustified or ambiguous punishment, but rarely after justified
punishment. Such counter-punishments could relate to social
norms like ‘‘showing strength’’ or ‘‘avoiding to lose face’’ and are
in line with biblical norms such as ‘‘an eye for an eye’’.
Furthermore, ‘‘natural’’ vendettas occur more frequently in
regions where institutional punishment is rather weak or absent
[55]. Considering real-world observations, we find it worthwhile to
investigate multiple rounds of punishment in an experimental
setting where punishment can be peer-based, but also institution-
alized. Due to assured institutionalized punishment, peer-punish-
ment might become less important, resulting in a reduced
likelihood of vendettas. That cooperation is promoted by
institutional punishment has been shown theoretically [56], but
whether this inhibits vendettas on the peer-level remains a topic of
future research. In addition, switching of partners could also avoid
vendettas, especially in dyadic relationships. This preference to
switch partners has been reported from reef fish who stop
interacting with a cheating cleaner fish when they have access to
several cleaners. However, sole access to a single cleaner leads to
punishment of cheating behaviour to change the quality of the
cleaner service [57]. Humans also prefer to end dyadic relation-
ships with uncooperative partners [58] and possibly treat counter-
punishing partners in a similar way. The importance of
institutionalized punishment and partner switching as potential
mechanisms to prevent escalations into costly vendettas has to be
investigated further.
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